Brooklyn Law Review
Volume 59
Issue 1
The Fifth Abraham L. Pomerantz Lecture: The New
Corporate Law

1-1-1993

The Duty of Loyalty and the Evolution of the
Scope of Judicial Review
Dennis J. Block
Michael J. Maimone

Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr
Recommended Citation
Dennis J. Block & Michael J. Maimone, The Duty of Loyalty and the Evolution of the Scope of Judicial Review, 59 Brook. L. Rev. 65
(1993).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/blr/vol59/iss1/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Brooklyn Law
Review by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.

Article 2

THE DUTY OF LOYALTY AND THE EVOLUTION OF
THE SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
Dennis J. Block, Michael J. Maimone and Steven B. Ross*
INTRODUCTION

The duty of loyalty-the obligation of corporate fiduciaries
to act with disinterested independence and to exercise judgment unaffected by personal financial interest in making business decisions-has existed and has well served and protected
equityholders since the inception of the corporate vehicle as an
entity used to efficiently aggregate "capital from numerous
investors" and operate a "large business with numerous owners
and employees."' While the standard by which courts have
reviewed claims for breach of this duty has evolved with the
advancements in corporate governance, this basic duty owed by
fiduciaries to the corporation and its shareholders has remained strong and intact.
Indeed, during the last two decades, with the emphasis on
making the corporation more competitive, enormous changes
have occurred in the governance of public companies, including
changes in the composition of boards of directors (resulting in
more independent boards) and the utilization of specialized
board committees consisting of independent directors to address conflict-of-interest transactions and related issues. It is
with this background and development in the governance of
public corporations that courts and legislatures have considered and evaluated issues involving the duty of loyalty. In
addressing the duties of corporate fiduciaries, courts and legislatures have recognized that courts should give great deference
in reviewing business decisions where the decisionmaker is not

* Messrs. Block, Maimone and Ross are members of the New York bar and
practice law with Weil, Gotshal & Manges. Portions of this article are derived
from DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL., THE BusINEss JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES
OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS (3d ed. 1989 & Supp. 1991).
1 ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAw 2 (1986).

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59: 65

tainted by personal financial interest, reserving more demanding judicial scrutiny where such independence is lacking. Thus,
in evaluating the current state of the duty of loyalty, the issue
is not whether such duty has "declined"-for it has not-but
rather the appropriate standard of judicial review to be applied
by a court.
The thesis of Professor Joel Seligman, that the duty of
loyalty is in decline and in need of help by way of federal regulation, is a romantic notion that finds its roots in the bowels of
some past period when corporate governance was inits infancy
and has no relationship to the current state of the governance
of public corporations. Specifically, Professor Seligman writes
in his contribution to this Symposium that "[i]n sum, I believe
we have reached a point where Congress should consider buttressing the state law duties of loyalty and care with concurrent federal legislation. The appropriate legislation, however,
should not fully preempt state law and should be no broader
than its demonstrated need."2
This Article disagrees with Professor Seligman's conclusion
that there is a "demonstrated need" for a federal corporate law.
Aside from not offering any basis for concluding that "we have
reached a point where Congress should consider buttressing"
state corporate law, and failing to set forth precisely the scope
of such federal regulation, Professor Seligman ignores the
significance courts and legislatures place on decisions of disinterested directors3 and the important role such directors play
in the governance of modern publicly-held corporations. In
sum, Professor Seligman's proposal reflects an approach that
was rejected almost twenty years ago4 and, with the significant developments in corporate governance over the last two
decades, should similarly be rejected today.
In response to Professor Seligman's proposal, this Article
surveys the evolving law governing conduct and transactions
involving conflicts of interest between the corporation and one
or more of its fiduciaries. This survey includes an analysis of
2 Joel Seligman, The New Corporate Law, 59 BROoL L. REv. 1, 62-3 (1993).

Unless otherwise noted, the term "disinterested director" in this Article refers to an outside, non-management director who is not financially interested in
the subject matter of the litigation at issue.
' See generally William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections

Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974).
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the scope of judicial review of directorial decisions involving
such loyalty concerns (including transactions involving corporate control, derivative litigation against corporate fiduciaries
and controlling shareholder transactions), and discusses the
two competing standards of review that courts utilize in adjudicating loyalty issues-the business judgment rule and the
fairness standard.

I.

THE DUTY OF LOYALTY AND THE STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW

Corporate directors and officers owe fiduciary duties to the
corporations they serve. These fiduciary duties include the
duty of care and the duty of loyalty.5 "In simplest terms, the
duty of care requires that directors exercise the care that an
ordinary prudent person would exercise under similar circumstances,6 and the duty of loyalty prohibits faithlessness and
self-dealing."7 The business judgment rule is a specific application of this directorial standard of conduct. In general terms,
under the business judgment rule, courts will not interfere
with a business decision if it is made in good faith by disinterested directors after reasonable investigation and does not
constitute an abuse of discretion.'
Where interested fiduciaries engage in a transaction with
the corporation to which they owe a duty, because of the danger such fiduciaries will make business decisions for their
personal benefit and to the detriment of the corporation, the
fiduciaries are denied the protection of the business judgment
rule. Rather, the fiduciaries, absent the utilization of certain
safeguards,9 have the burden of demonstrating the "fairness"
of the transaction in litigation challenging the transaction
itself or seeking to impose liability on the fiduciaries.

5 See generally DENNIS J. BLOCK ET AL., THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS (3d ed. 1989 & Supp. 1991).
6

See, e.g., Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace, Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 264 (2d Cir.

1984); MODEL BusINESs CORP. ACT § 8.30 (1991) [hereinafter M.B.C.A.].
7

See, e.g., Norlin Corp., 744 F.2d at 264; M.B.C.A. § 8.30.

8

See generally BLOCK ET AL., supra note 5, at 4-8.

9 See generally infra notes 145-62 and accompanying text.
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A. The Business Judgment Rule and the FairnessStandard
Business decisions by corporate directors are ordinarily
evaluated by the courts in accordance with the business judgment rule. The courts of Delaware" have frequently described
the business judgment rule as a "presumption" of regularity-it "is a presumption that in making a business decision the
directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good
faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the
best interests of the company."" The party challenging the

" The authors cite to and discuss primarily Delaware decisional law because,
based upon the large number of corporations incorporated in Delaware, Delaware
has a sophisticated, well-developed case law with respect to corporate law issues
and courts from other jurisdictions give deference to the decisions of Delaware
courts. See Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Serv., Inc., 908 F.2d 1338, 1343 (7th Cir. 1990)
(referring to the Delaware courts as "the Mother Court of corporate law"), rev'd on
other grounds, 111 S. Ct. 1711 (1991); see also Landy v. Amsterdam, 815 F.2d
925, 929-30 (3d Cir. 1987) ("[f]inding no Pennsylvania case in point, the district
court predicted that Pennsylvania would follow the law of Delaware;" "[w]e agree
with the district court"); Dynamics Corp. of Am. v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250, 253
(7th Cir. 1986) ("Indiana takes its cues in matters of corporation law from the
Delaware courts."), rev'd on other grounds, 481 U.S. 69 (1987); NCR Corp. v.
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 761 F. Supp. 475, 499 (S.D. Ohio 1991) ("[T]he decisions
of Delaware courts are often persuasive in the field of corporate law."); Weiland v.
Illinois Power Co., [1990-1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,747,
at 98,589-90 (C.D. Ill. Sept. 17, 1990) ("Delaware is often recognized as an authority for corporate law."); Detwiler v. Offenbecher, 728 F. Supp. 103, 147 n.17
(S.D.N.Y. 1989) ("Michigan courts look to Delaware law as a guide for adjudicating
matters involving corporate law."); cf Leo Herzel & Laura D. Richman, Foreword
to the Second Edition Volume One of R. FRANKLiN BALOTTI & JESSE A.
FINKELSTEIN, THE DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND BusINEss ORGANIZATIONS

at F-1 (2d ed. 1990 & Supp. 1991) (over 40% of the companies listed on the New
York Stock Exchange and over 50% of Fortune 500 companies are incorporated in
Delaware).
" Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). In addition to Aronson,
since 1984, the Delaware Supreme Court has consistently (fifteen times) defined
the business judgment rule, which is typically the governing standard in cases
challenging board conduct, as a presumption. See Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 83
(Del. 1992); Kahn v. Sullivan, 594 A.2d 48, 59 (Del. 1991); Levine v. Smith, 591
A.2d 194, 207 (Del. 1991); Gilbert v. El Paso Co., 575 A.2d 1131, 1145, 1147 (Del.
1990); Spiegel v. Buntrock, 571 A.2d 767, 774 (Del. 1990); In re Resorts Int'l
Shareholders Litig. Appeals, 570 A-2d 259, 267 (Del. 1990); Citron v. Fairchild
Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A2d 53, 64 (Del. 1989); Mills Acquis. Co. v.
MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1288 (Del. 1989); Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180,
187 (Del. 1988); Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1341
(Del. 1987); Polk v. Good, 507 A.2d 531, 536 (Del. 1986); Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180 (Del. 1986); Moran v.
Household Intl, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del. 1985); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Pe-
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board's decision, therefore, bears the burden of establishing
facts rebutting the presumption.'
The Delaware Court of Chancery summarized the effect of
the business judgment rule and its presumption in Paramount
Communications,Inc. v. Time, Inc.:'
The value of a shareholder's investment, over time, rises or falls
chiefly because of the skill, judgment and perhaps luck-for it is
present in all human affairs-of the management and directors of
the enterprise. When they exercise sound or brilliant judgment,
shareholders are likely to profit; when they fail to do so, share values likely will fail to appreciate. In either event, the financial vitality of the corporation and the value of the company's shares is in the
hands of the directors and managers of the firm. The corporation
law does not operate on the theory that directors, in exercising their
powers to manage the firm, are obligated to follow the wishes of a
majority of shares. In fact, directors, not shareholders, are charged
with the duty to manage the firm.
In the decision they have reached here, the Time board may be
proven in time to have been brilliantly prescient or dismayingly
wrong. In this decision, as in other decisions affecting the financial
value of their investment, the shareholders will bear the effects for
good or ill. That many, presumably most, shareholders would prefer
the board to do otherwise than it has done does not... afford a
basis to interfere with the effectuation of the board's business judgment."4

Simply stated, "the business judgment rule operates as a judicial acknowledgement of a board of directors' managerial prerogatives."'5
Where the party challenging a board's decision overcomes
this presumption, the business judgment rule will have no
applicability and the transaction or conduct at issue will be
scrutinized by the court to determine whether it is fair to the
corporation. 6 The rationale for this fairness standard "is that

troleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858,
872 (Del. 1985).
- See Spiegel, 571 A.2d at 774; see also Short v. McNatt, No. 10077, 1991 WL

85839, at *4 (Del. Ch. May 20, 1991) (plaintiff bears the burden of "establishing
by a preponderance of the evidence that [the business judgment rule is] not present").
' [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 94,514 (Del. Ch. July 14,
1989), affd, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990).
4 Id. at 93,284.
Spiegel, 571 A.2d at 774.

'8

See, e.g., Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, 744 F.2d 255, 264 (2d Cir. 1984); Gearhart
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where corporate fiduciaries, because of a conflict, are disabled
from safeguarding the interests of the stockholders to whom
they owe a duty, the Court will furnish compensatory procedural safeguards by imposing upon the fiduciaries an exacting
burden of establishing the utmost propriety and fairness of
their actions." 7 As the Delaware Court of Chancery explained
in Cinerama, Inc. v. Techniiolor, Inc.,8 under the business
judgment rule standard of review, "the plaintiff bears the burden to establish each element of the claim he asserts.. . by a
preponderance of credible evidence," whereas once the fairness
standard is involved, "it is the defendant who is called upon to
establish that the transaction attacked was on terms entirely
fair to the corporation or, in some circumstances, to the
corporation's stockholders." 9
In comparison to the scope of judicial review underlying
the business judgment rule, the fairness standard is quite
exacting, requiring rigorous judicial scrutiny of the transaction.2" Thus, "because the effect of the proper invocation of the
business judgment rule is so powerful and the standard of
entire fairness so exacting, the determination of the appropriate standard of judicial review frequently is determinative of
the outcome of [the] litigation."2 ' It is important to note, however, that "the entire fairness rule does not.., always implicate liability of the conflicted corporate decisionmaker, nor
does it necessarily render the decision void."' Rather, the
fairness standard "requires 'judicial scrutiny" of the transacIndus., Inc. v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 741 F.2d 707, 720 (5th Cir. 1984); Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 893 (Del. 1985); Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp.,
559 A.2d 257, 271 (Del. Ch. 1989); see also Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 187
(Del. 1988) ("Fairness becomes an issue only if the presumption of the business
judgment rule is defeated.").
17 Van de Walle v. Unimation, Inc., [1990-1991 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 95,834, at 99,030-31 (Del. Ch. Mar. 6, 1991).
18 No. 8358, 1991 WL 111134 (Del. Ch. June 24, 1991).
'9Id. at *9.
'0 See, e.g., Mills Acquis. Co. v. Macmillian, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1280 (Del.
1989); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710-11 (Del. 1983); Gottlieb v.
Heyden Chem. Corp., 91 A.2d 57, 58 (Del. 1952).
21 Macmillan, 559 A.2d at 1279 (quoting AC Acquis. Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton
& Co., 519 A.2d 103, 111 (Del. Ch. 1986)); see also Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, Inc.,
579 A.2d 1115, 1123 (Del. Ch. 1990) (the determination that "the propriety of [a]
decision is to be measured by the permissive business judgment form of review ... ordinarily end[s] the matter, practically speaking") (citations omitted).
' Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1376 (Del. 1993).
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tion because "when there is no independent corporate
decisionmaker, the court may become the objective arbiter."'
Indeed, the business judgment rule versus the fairness
form of judicial review question "transcends the questions of
burden of going forward," because if directors fail to carry their
burden under the fairness test "they may be liable not simply
to compensate the corporation or its shareholders for losses
sustained," but may be required "to rescind the transaction or
pay rescissory damages. This measure, while not definitively
described, may certainly exceed loss to the corporation and its
shareholders and may, analogously to trust measures of recovery, in some instances, capture defendants' profit from the
transaction."24 Accordingly, there are "enormous substantive
law, not just procedural, consequences to employing the entire
fairness form of judicial review."25
B. Elements of Loyalty
The protection afforded by the business judgment rule only
shields corporate decisionmakers and their decisions from judicial second-guessing where, among other things, the
decisionmakers are not subject to disqualifying conflicts of
interest with respect to the subject matter of their decision.26
The American Bar Association ("ABA") explained the duty of
loyalty in the Model Business Corporation Act ("MBCA) 27 as
follows:
By assuming his office, the corporate director commits allegiance to
the enterprise and acknowledges that the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders must prevail over any individual interest
of his own. The basic principle to be observed is that the director

Id.; cf id. at 1376 n.7 (an independent corporation decisionmaker "could be a
disinterested and independent majority of the board of directors or the shareholders.") (citing Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218 (Del. 1976)).
24 Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., No. 8358, 1991 WL 111134, at *9 (Del.
Ch. June 24, 1991) (citing 3 AUSTIN W. SCOTr & WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, THE LAW
OF TRUSTS § 205, at 241-42 (4th ed. 1988)).
Id. at *11.
' See, e.g., Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace, Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 264 (2d Cir.
1984); M.B.CA. § 8.30.
' The MBCA is a publication prepared by the Committee on Corporate Laws
of the Section of Corporation, Banlng and Business Law (now the Section of
Business Law) of the American Bar Association.
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should not use his corporate position to make a personal profit or
gain other personal advantage.'

As the Delaware Supreme Court recognized in its landmark
decision in Guth v. Loft, Inc.:29
Corporate officers and directors are not permitted to use their position of trust and confidence to further their private interests. While
technically not trustees, they stand in a fiduciary relation to the
corporation and its stockholders. A public policy, existing through
the years, and derived from a profound knowledge of human characteristics and motives, has established a rule that demands of a corporate officer or director, peremptorily and inexorably, the most
scrupulous observance of his duty, not only affirmatively to protect
the interests of the corporation committed to his charge, but also to
refrain from doing anything that would work injury to the corporation, or to deprive it of profit or advantage which his skill and
ability might properly bring to it, or to enable it to make in the
reasonable and lawful exercise of its powers. The rule that requires
an undivided and unselfish loyalty to the corporation demands that
there shall be no conflict between duty and self-interest.' °

Moreover, the "profound knowledge of human characteristics and motives" described above requires "a recognition that
where a director ... stands to benefit personally from the
decision as director ... his ... business judgment is likely to
be affected by personal interest."3 Put another way, directors
must "possess a disinterested independence and ... not stand
in a dual relation which prevents an unprejudicial exercise of
judgment." 2 Accordingly, a court's general "unwillingness to
assess the merits (or fairness) of business decisions of necessity
ends when a transaction is one involving a predominantly
interested board with financial interests in the transaction
adverse to the corporation."33 The duty of loyalty is thus

ABA Comm. on Corp. Laws, The Corporate Director's Guidebook (rev. ed.
1978), 33 Bus. LAw. 1591, 1599 (1978).
5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939).
"0Id. at 510; see also Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306-07 (1939).
31 S. Samuel Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HoFSTRA L. REV.
93, 115 (1979).
32 Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 631, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1001, 419
N.Y.S.2d 920, 927 (1979).
' AC Acquis. Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 111 (Del. Ch.
1986).
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transgressed when a corporate fiduciary uses his or her corporate
office or, in the case of a controlling shareholder, control over the
corporate machinery, to promote, advance or effectuate a transaction
between the corporation and such person (or an entity in which the
fiduciary has a material economic interest, directly or indirectly) and
that transaction is not substantively fair to the corporation.'

The Delaware Supreme Court has recognized that, in satisfying their duty of loyalty, directors must be disinterested
and independent. 5 In order to demonstrate a lack of "director
disinterest," plaintiffs must allege "either a financial interest
or entrenchment [motive] on the part of the ... directors."36
Indeed, where the party challenging a transaction establishes
a "material" personal interest or self-dealing by a majority of
the corporation's directors, the business judgment rule generally has no applicability." Allegations that the directors are
paid for their services as directors, without more, do not establish a material financial interest. 8
The Delaware Court of Chancery defined "material" as "a
financial interest that in the circumstances created a reasonable probability that the independence of the judgment of a
reasonable person in such circumstances could be affected to
the detriment of the shareholders generally.""9 The court emphasized that "[i]n some instances an arguable or an established personal financial benefit may, when viewed in context,
be found to be immaterial in fact to the exercise of a judgment

' Solash v. Telex Corp., [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
93,608, at 97,727 (Del. Ch. Jan. 19, 1988); cf. AC Acquis., 519 A.2d at 114-15
(finding "a breach of a duty of loyalty, albeit a possibly unintended one," on the
ground that the effect of a board's timing of a defensive self-tender offer was to
"deprive shareholders of an option that may as likely as not be the more attractive alternative to a majority of them").
Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 188-89 (Del. 1988).
Id. at 188.

See, e.g., Jedwab v. MGM Grand Hotels, Inc., 509 A.2d 584, 595 n.7 (Del.
Ch. 1986); see also Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 626 (Del. 1984) (for the business judgment rule to become inapplicable, "material" interest must afflict a majority of the corporation's directors); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 815 n.8
(1984) (same).
' Grobow, 539 A.2d at 188-89 (citing In re E.F. Hutton Banking Practices
Litig., 634 F. Supp. 265, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (construing Delaware law) and
Moran v. Household Intl, Inc., 490 A.2d 1059, 1074-75 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, 500 A.2d
1346 (Del. 1985)).
Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, No. 8358, 1991 WL 111134, at *10 (Del. Ch.
June 24, 1991).
"
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motivated entirely to achieve the best available result for the
corporation and (in the sale context) for its shareholders."40 In
the court's words:
An example will, I think, demonstrate the point. Consider the
case of the sale of a public company which is owned 35% by the CEO
and 10% by the company's vice president. The company has a market capitalization of $100 million. The two officers constitute a majority of the board. Each has a salary and benefit package worth
approximately $550,000 per year. During arm's-length bargaining an
acquisition of the corporation is negotiated with a third party for
$160 million cash. As part of the transaction, it is agreed that the
two officers will remain as officers of the company at a new higher
(say doubled) salary.
Assume now that a shareholder sues the directors claiming
that they negligently failed to get the best available price. The directors didn't shop the company, "locked up" the sale, and had no fiduciary out in the merger agreement. Plaintiff also (implausibly) asserts that the directors pushed this transaction rather than search
for a higher alternative that might have been found in order to get
the higher salaries that the acquiror proposed. Must the directors
assume the burden of establishing the entire fairness of the transaction?41

Applying the materiality standard it had established, the court
in Technicolor acknowledged that the directors in its hypothetical "do have a financial interest in the merger not shared by
the other shareholders," but concluded that the directors would
not have a "material" interest in the transaction different from
the interest of other shareholders, and that their conduct
should therefore be tested pursuant to the business judgment
rule.42

In order to demonstrate a lack of "director independence,"
plaintiffs must allege that a majority of the corporate directors
"were dominated or otherwise controlled by an individual or
entity interested in the transaction."' "Control" and "domination" are difficult terms to define precisely, but "at minimUM... imply (in actual exercise) a direction of corporate
conduct in such a way as to comport with the wishes or inter-

0 Id.
41

Id.

Id.
' Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 189 (Del. 1988) (citing Aronson v. Lewis, 473
42

A.2d 805, 815-16 (Del. 1984)).
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ests of the corporation (or persons) doing the controlling.""
"Control" and "domination" may be the result of either (i) ownership of or the unrestricted power to vote more than fifty
percent of the corporation's outstanding voting securities, or (ii)
actual control over a majority of the corporation's board of
directors or other managing body.4"
A particularly important case in this regard is Puma v.
Marriott." In Puma, the Marriott Corporation purchased
stock held by entities controlled by the Marriott family, a fortyfour percent shareholder controlling four of nine seats on
Marriott's board." On the basis of the process followed by the
disinterested directors, the court found that the transaction at
issue was not an interested director transaction, and evaluated
the transaction pursuant to the business judgment rule:
[P]laintiff here has utterly failed to make any showing of domination
of the outside directors. No attempt was made to impugn the integrity or good faith of these directors, all of whom were men of experience in the business and financial world. There is no testimony
which even tends to show that the terms of the transaction were dictated by the Marriott Group or any member thereof. On the contrary, the valuations of the property companies and the Marriott
stock were made by a majority of Marriott directors, whose independence is unchallenged, based upon appraisal, analysis, information
and opinions provided by independent experts, whose qualifications
are not questioned. In these circumstances it cannot be said that the
Marriott Group stood "on both sides of the transaction" .... There48
fore, the test here applicable is that of business judgment.

Accordingly, "a shareholder owes a fiduciary duty only if it
owns a majority interest in or exercises control over the business affairs of the corporation."49

Kaplan v. Centex Corp., 284 A.2d 119, 123 (Del. Ch. 1971).
See, e.g., Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572, 575 (2d Cir. 1962);
Gottesman v. General Motors Corp., 279 F. Supp. 361, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
283 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 1971).
4
41 Id. at 693-96.
Id. at 695.

" Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1332, 1344 (Del.
1987); see also, Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 808-09 (Del. 1985) (court held
that directorial independence was present even though it was alleged that the
corporation's directors were nominated or elected at the behest of the 47% stockholders); Siegman v. Tri-Star Pictures, Inc., No. 9477, 1989 WL 48746, at *3 (Del.
Ch. May 5, 1989) ("For a shareholder to occupy the status of a fiduciary, it must
either have majority stock control or exercise actual domination and control over
the corporation's business affairs."); In re Sea-Land Corp. Shareholders Litig.,
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INTERESTED DIRECTOR TRANSACTIONS

At common law, interested director transactions were
voidable even if such transactions were fair or approved by
disinterested directors or shareholders.' ° This stringent rule
applied to individual contracts between the corporation and its
directors5 and interlocking directorates, including where only
a minority of the directors were common with respect to the
contracting corporations." Such a rule (treating interested
director transactions as voidable without regard to fairness) is
arguably equivalent to a rule per se prohibiting such transactions in their entirety.
This prohibition against interested director transactions
did not survive the test of time. One commentator described
the evolution of the law pertaining to interested director transactions, starting in the late nineteenth century through 1960:
a. Prohibition.
In 1880 it could have been stated with confidence that in the United
States the general rule was that any contract between a director

and his corporation was voidable at the instance of the corporation
or its shareholders, without regard to the fairness or unfairness of

[1988-1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 93,923, at 90,186 (Del. Ch.

May 13, 1988); In re Sea-Land Corp. Shareholders Litig., No. 8453, 1988 WL
49126, at *3 (Del. Ch. May 22, 1987) ("A stockholder is not deemed controlling
unless it owns a majority of the stock . . . or has exercised actual domination and
control in directing the corporation's business affairs."); cf Banco De Desarrollo
Agropecuario v. Gibbs, 709 F. Supp. 1302, 1306 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) ("Control persons . . . are those persons who exercise de facto control of the corporation.").
'" See, e.g., Munson v. Syracuse, Geneva & Coming R.R., 103 N.Y. 59, 73
(1886) (such a contract "is repugnant to the great rule of law which invalidates all
contracts made by a trustee or fiduciary, in which he is personally interested, at
the election of the party he represents"); cf. Oberly v. Kirby, 592 A.2d 445, 466
(Del. 1991) ("At common law, a corporation's stockholders did have the power to
nullify an interested [director] transaction, although considerations of the
transaction's fairness appear to have played some part in judicial decisions applying this rule."). But see generally Norwood P. Beveridge, Jr., The Corporate
Director's Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty: Understanding the Self-Interested Director
Transaction, 41 DE PAUL L. REv. 655, 659 (1992) ("All current thinking on the
corporate director's duty of loyalty appears to start with the proposition, which
seems now to be universally accepted, that transactions between a director and his
corporation at common law were generally voidable without regard to fairness. It
is submitted that this proposition is completely erroneous.") (footnote omitted).
51 See, e.g., Wardell v. Union Pac. R.R., 103 U.S. 651, 658 (1880).
52 See, e.g., Metropolitan Elevated Ry. v. Manhattan Elevated Ry., 11 Daly 373,
491 (N.Y. Com. Pls. 1884).
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the transaction.
b. Approval by a disinterested majority of the board.
[I]n 1910 ...the general rule was that a contract between a director
and his corporation was valid if it was approved by a disinterested
majority of his fellow directors and was not found to be unfair or
fraudulent by the court if challenged; but that a contract in which a
majority of the board was interested was voidable at the instance of
the corporation or its shareholders without regard to any question of
fairness.
c. Judicial review of the fairness of the transaction.
By 1960 ...the general rule was that no transaction of a corporation with any or all of its directors was automatically voidable at the
suit of the shareholder, whether there was a disinterested majority
of the board or not; but that the courts would review such a contract
and subject it to rigid and careful scrutiny, and would invalidate the
contract if it was found to be unfair to the corporation.'

The elimination of the principle of automatic voidability of
conflict-of-interest transactions (including transactions between
corporations with one or more common directors) has been
codified by many state legislatures in so-called safe-harbor
statutes 4 These statutes recognize that some interested director transactions "are not inherently detrimental to a corporation."55 As the drafters of the MBCA explain:
[Tihe essential character of interest conflict is often, unfortunately,
misunderstood by the public and the media (and sometimes misunderstood, too, by lawyers and judges). Interest conflicts can and
often do lead to baneful acts. The law regulates interest conflict
transactions because experience shows that people may be injured.
That contingent fear is sufficient reason to warrant caution and to
apply special standards and procedures to interest conflict transactions.

Harold Marsh, Jr., Are Directors Trustees? Conflict of Interest and Corporate
Morality, 22 Bus. LAw. 35, 36, 39-40 (1966), quoted in David S. Ruder, Duty of
Loyalty-A Law Professor's Status Report, 40 Bus. LAw. 1383, 1387-88 (1985) and
in A.A. Sommer, Jr., The Duty of Loyalty in the ALI's Corporate Governance Project, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 719, 719-20 (1984).
5 See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 310 (West 1990); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §
144(a) (1991); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw §§ 713(a)-(d) (McKinney 1986); M.B.C.A.
§§ 8.60-8.63. Statutes regulating interested director transactions have been enacted
in 47 states. Three states-Massachusetts, South Dakota and Utah-and the District of Columbia have not enacted statutory provisions regulating interested director transactions.
65Oberly v. Kirby, 592 A.2d 445, 467 (Del. 1991).
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Nonetheless, it is important to keep firmly in mind that it is a contingent risk we are dealing with-that an interest conflict is not in
itself a crime or a tort or necessarily injurious to others. Contrary to
much popular usage, having "conflict of interest" is not something
one is "guilty of"; it is simply a state of affairs. Indeed, in many
situations, the corporation and the shareholders may secure major
benefits from a transaction despite the presence of a director's conflicting interest."8

The rationale underlying such statutes appears to be that
business judgment rule protection is appropriate for an interested director or officer transaction where "a fully informed
majority of disinterested directors properly applies its business
judgment in good faith to authorize the transaction."5 7 Interested director transactions are similarly sanitized where the
approval of fully-informed and disinterested shareholders has
been secured. 8 As the Delaware courts have noted, "the entire atmosphere is freshened and a new set of rules invoked
where formal approval has been given by a majority of independent, fully informed stockholders."59 During the 1980s, the
rationale underlying safe-harbor statutes was applied by courts
in addressing loyalty issues that arose in corporate control
transactions and in connection with issues of shareholder
standing to commence derivative litigation.

M.B.C.A. §§ 8.60-8.63, at 280-81 (1991) (Intro. Cmt.).
BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 10, § 4.9, at 122; see also International
Ins. Co. v. Johns, 874 F.2d 1447, 1460-61 (11th Cir. 1989) (construing Florida law;
the business judgment rule protects interested director transactions upon a showing of complete disclosure of all material information and approval or ratification
by disinterested directors); Oberly, 592 A.2d at 467 ("The key to upholding an
interested [director] transaction is the approval of some neutral decision making
body."); Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A.2d 400, 405 n.3 (Del. 1987) ("approval by fullyinformed disinterested directors under [Delaware General Corporations Law] section 144(a)(1) . . . permits invocation of the business judgment rule and limits
judicial review to issues of gift or waste with the burden of proof upon the party
attacking the transaction").
" See BALOTTI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 10, § 4.9, at 122; see also Oberly,
592 A.2d at 467 ("a transaction will be sheltered from shareholders challenge if
approved by either a committee of independent directors, the shareholders, or
'

courts");

Marciano, 535

A.2d

at

405

n.3

("approval

by ...

disinterested

stockholders under [Del. Gen. Corp. L.] section 144 (a)(2), permits invocation of the
business judgment rules").
r" Gottlieb v. Heyden Chem. Corp., 91 A.2d 57, 59, (Del. 1952), quoted in
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 890 (Del. 1985).
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Corporate Control Transactions

A.

The 1980s represented "a decade in which unprecedented
merger and acquisition activity raised issues of corporate law
that had lain dormant for fifty years."' ° These issues included
the appropriate scope of judicial review to be applied by courts
in the context of (i) defensive measures-conduct having the
effect of defeating or (arguably) impeding a change in corporate
control-adopted by directors, and (ii) interested directors
engaged in transactions involving the control of corporations.
In connection with board action in response to an unwanted takeover threat, the Delaware Supreme Court decision in
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.6 established a standard
of judicial review to be applied to defensive measures adopted
by directors of Delaware corporations.62 In holding that the
traditional business judgment rule, in the first instance, is
inapplicable to defensive action taken by directors, the supreme court explained that in the control context the "omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in its
own interests, rather than those of the corporation and its
shareholders [gives rise to] an enhanced duty"63 to shareholders that dictates "judicial examination at the threshold before
the protections of the business judgment rule may be conferred."' Thus, where directors adopt defensive measures, the
court recognized that there exists an inherent conflict of interest with respect to such conduct.
Accordingly, unlike traditional business judgment rule
cases where the burden of proof is on the party challenging the
transaction, the initial burden in cases involving the adoption
of defensive measures lies with the directors, who must demon-

6 William T. Allen, Independent Directors in MBO Transactions:Are They Fact

or Fantasy?,45 BUS. LAW. 2055, 2055 (1990).
6' 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
62
63

Id. at 954-57.
Id. at 954.

' Id. Subsequent cases reaffirming Unocal on this point include: Stroud v.
Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 82 (Del. 1992); Gilbert v. El Paso, 575 A.2d 1131, 1144 (Del.
1990); Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1154 (Del.
1990); Mills Acquis. Co. v. Macmillan, 559 A.2d 1261, 1287 (Del. 1988); Moran v.
Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1350 (Del. 1988); Ivanhoe Partners v.
Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1341 (Del. 1987); Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180 (Del. 1985).
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strate (i) that they had "reasonable grounds for believing that
a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed," and (ii)
that the defensive measures decided upon were "reasonable in
relation to the threat posed."65 A board undertaking this analysis must evaluate "the nature of the takeover bid and its
effect on the corporate enterprise."' This involves consideration of various factors including:
the adequacy and terms of the offer; its fairness and feasibility; the
proposed or actual financing for the offer, and the consequences of
that financing; questions of illegality; the impact of both the bid and
the potential acquisition on other constituencies, provided that it
bears some reasonable relationship to general shareholder interests;
the risk of nonconsummation; the basic stockholder interests at
stake; the bidder's identity, prior background and other business
venture experiences; and the bidder's business plans for the corporation and their effects on stockholder interests.'

The two-pronged Unocal burden may be satisfied "by showing
good faith and reasonable investigation."' Once this burden
is met, traditional business judgment rule principles apply and
the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating a breach of the
directors' fiduciary duties.69
The Delaware Supreme Court recognized, however, that
the proof presented by the board in support of its initial burden of demonstrating the "reasonableness" of its actions is
"materially enhanced" where a majority of the board consists of
"outside independent directors." 0 Likewise, in the context of a
board response to an unwanted takeover, several courts outside Delaware have held that the business judgment rule's
presumption of good faith is heightened where a majority of
the board is composed of independent, outside directors. 1
Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955; see also Stroud, 606 A.2d at 82; Time, 571 A.2d at
1152; Macmillan, 559 A.2d at 1288; Ivanhoe, 535 A.2d at 1341; Revlon, 506 A.2d

at 180; Moran, 500 A.2d at 1356.
Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955; see also Ivanhoe, 535 A.2d at 1341-42.
Macmillan, 559 A.2d at 1282 n.29; see also Time, 571 A.2d at 1153; Unocal,
493 A.2d at 955-56 (quoting Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d. 548, 555 (Del. Ch. 1964)).
68 Unocal, 493 A-2d at 955; see also Time, 571 A.2d at 1152; Ivanhoe, 535 A.2d
at 1341; Revlon, 506 A.2d at 180; Moran, 500 A.2d at 1356.
69 See Moran, 500 A.2d at 1356 (citing Unocal, 493 A.2d at 958).
'0 Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955; see also Ivanhoe, 535 A.2d at 1343; Moran, 500
A.2d at 1350.
"

See Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 294 (7th Cir.), cert. de-

nied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Enterra Corp. v. SGS Assoc., 600 F. Supp. 678, 685
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Similarly, where interested directors are engaged in transactions involving the control of corporations, business judgment rule protection has been secured by the formation of
special committees consisting solely of outside directors.72 As
the Delaware Court of Chancery explained in Freedman v.
Restaurant Associates Industries, Inc., "[h]eavy reliance is
placed upon the acts of specially constituted committees of disinterested directors when Delaware courts are asked to review
the propriety of corporate transactions that involve elements or
claims of self-dealing."73 Similarly, in In re First Boston, Inc.
Shareholders Litigation,4 the chancery court emphasized the
role a properly functioning committee of disinterested directors
may play in the context of control transactions, and explained
that it is "the critical... power to say no" that "gives utility to
the device of special board committees:"75
The power to say no is a significant power. It is the duty of directors
serving on such a committee to approve only a transaction that is in
the best interests of the public shareholders, to shy no to any transaction that is not fair to those shareholders and is not the best
transaction available. It is not sufficient for such directors to achieve
the best price that a fiduciary will pay if that price is not a fair
price. Nor is [it] sufficient to get a price that falls within a range of
'fair values' somehow defined, if the fiduciary (or another) would pay
more. The fiduciary's best price may not be fair and the fiduciary's]
position may preclude the emerge[nce] of alternative transactions at
a higher price. The only leverage that a special committee may have
where a fiduciary's position precludes alternatives (such as ...
where a controlling shareholder owns a majority of voting power) is
the power to say no and, thus, to force the fiduciary to choose among
the options of implementing a frank self-dealing transaction at a
price that knowledgeable directors have disapproved, to improve the
terms of the transaction or abandon the transaction.

(E.D. Pa. 1985). But see Dynamics Corp. of America v. CTS Corp., 794 F.2d 250,
256 (7th Cir. 1986) (questioning whether any special weight should be placed upon
the fact that a board consists of a majority of outside directors), rev'd on other
grounds, 481 U.S. 69 (1987); Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace, Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 266
n.12 (2d Cir. 1984) (same).
2

See, e.g., In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. Shareholders Litig., [1988-89 Transfer

Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,194, at 91,712-14 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 1989).
" [1987-88 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,502, at 97,219 (Del.
Ch. Oct. 16, 1987).
' [1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 95,322 (Del. Ch. June 7,
1990).
TId. at 96,541.
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When independent, directors understand the nature of their
mission when negotiating a change of control transaction in which
management or a controlling shareholder is involved-to agree only
to a transaction that is in the best interests of the public shareholders; to say no unless they conclude that they have achieved a fair
transaction that is the best transaction available-and where they
pursue that goal independently, in good faith and diligently, their
decision, in my opinion deserves the respect accorded by the business judgment rule.76

The mere existence of a majority of outside directors or a
special committee, however, does not insulate a transaction
from judicial scrutiny. In Robert M. Bass Group, Inc. v. Evans,77 for example, the Delaware Court of Chancery afforded
no weight to a special committee's approval of a dividend restructuring plan supported by management over an outside bid
where the committee did not take "reasonable measures to
uncover the facts," but simply "followed in lockstep"
management's desire not to investigate or negotiate the outside
bidder's offer.7"
B. Derivative Litigation
As in the context of corporate control transactions, courts
during the 1980s generally gave great deference to decisions by
directors to dismiss or terminate derivative litigation against
corporate fiduciaries where the decisionmaker itself was free of
any disabling conflict of interest. Indeed, as demonstrated
below, even where directors were named as defendants in a
derivative litigation, courts permitted the disinterested direc76 Id.; f Kahn v. Lynch Communication Sys., Inc., No. 8748, 1993 WL 290193,
at *4 (Del. Ch. July 9, 1993) ("[wjhile it would have been far better for the
'unanimous' recommendation of" a special committee, it is sufficient that "a majority of the members . . . concluded that the negotiated price was fair" to the shareholders).
552 A.2d 1227 (Del. Ch. 1988).
78 Id. at 1241; see also Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquis., Inc., 781 F.2d
264, 277 (2d Cir. 1984) (The "independent directors" appear "to have failed to
ensure that alternative bids were negotiated or scrutinized by those whose only
loyalty was to the shareholders."); Mills Acquis. Co. v. Macmillan, 559 A.2d 1261,
1280-82 (Del. 1988) (The court afforded no weight to the presence of a majority of
outside directors where there was no "broad planning and oversight to insulate the
self-interested management from improper access to [a] bidding process," and
where "[t]he board was torpid, if not supine, in its efforts to establish a truly
independent auction.").
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tors to determine whether the litigation against the defendantdirectors would be in the best interests of the corporation.7 9
A shareholder derivative action is a lawsuit brought by
one or more minority shareholders on behalf of a corporation to
remedy an alleged wrong to the corporation "[w]hen the corporate cause of action is for some reason not asserted by the
corporation itself."0 The action is "two-fold" in nature: "First,
it is the equivalent of a suit by the shareholders to compel the
corporation to sue. Second, it is a suit by the corporation, asserted by the shareholders on its behalf, against those liable to
it." 8 Accordingly, the lawsuit "[i]n a sense.., involves a double wrong to the corporation: (a) the basic wrong to it, and (b)

its not redressing such wrong directly." 2

Prior to filing a derivative action, a shareholder generally
must demand that the corporation's board of directors cause
the corporation to pursue the alleged claim.' Courts both in
and out of Delaware have repeatedly stated that the demand
requirement is not a "mere formalit[y] of litigation"' or a
"mere procedural nicety," 5 but a "stricture[] of substantive
law"86 of "critical importance"17 that represents "a deliberate
departure from the relaxed policy of 'notice' pleading."' The

' See infra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
80 HARRY G. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF THE CORPORATION AND OTHER
BUSINESS ENTERPRISES § 360, at 1045 (3d ed. 1983); see also Daily Income Fund,
Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 528 (1984) (quoting Hawes v. Oakland, 104 U.S. 450,
460 (1881)) (A derivative action is "found on a right of action existing in the corporation itself, and in which the corporation itself is the appropriate plaintiff.");

Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949) (A derivative
action allows a shareholder "to step into the corporation's shoes and to seek in its
right the restitution he could not demand on his own.").
", Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984), quoted in Kaplan v. Peat
Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 540 A.2d 726, 730 (Del. 1988).
" HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 80, § 360, at 1045 n.1.
8 See, e.g., FED. R. Cxv. P. 23.1; CAL. CORP. CODE § 800(b)(2) (West 1990);
DEL. CH. CT. R. 23.1; N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 626(c) (McKinney 1986); M.B.C.A.
§ 7.40(b).
s4 Tandycrafis, Inc. v. Initio Partners, 562 A.2d 1162, 1166 (Del. 1989).
8 Richardson v. Graves, No. 6617, 1983 WL 21109, at *2 (Del. Ch. June 17,
1983).
m Tandycrafts, 562 A.2d at 1166; see also, e.g., In re Kauffman Mut. Fund
Actions, 479 F.2d 257, 263 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 857 (1973); Cottle v.
Hilton Hotels Corp., 635 F. Supp. 1094, 1097 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
' Kaplan v. Peat Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 529 A.2d 254, 259 (Del. Ch. 1987),
rev'd on other grounds, 540 A.2d 726 (Del. 1988).
' Heit v. Baird, 567 F.2d 1157, 1160 (1st Cir. 1977); see also Kauffman, 479
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important "stricture of substantive law" underlying the demand requirement is the "basic principle... that directors,
rather than shareholders, manage the business and affairs of
the corporation .... The decision to bring a lawsuit or to refrain from litigating a claim on behalf of a corporation is a
decision concerning the management of the corporation."89 In
the words of Dean Robert C. Clark of Harvard University,
"[wihether to sue or not to sue is ordinarily a matter for the
business judgment of directors, just as is a decision that the
corporation will make bricks instead of bottles."' Thus, where
the defendant in a derivative action is a third party (not an
officer or director of the corporation), or where only a minority
of the directors are alleged to have a financial interest in the
conduct or transaction at issue, it is well settled that demand
must be made and the board of directors has the power to
determine whether to pursue the action; that decision is generally protected by the business judgment rule. 1
Different rules, however, govern the "unusual"92 case in
which a majority of the directors has a disabling conflict of
interest and, thus, where demand is excused. Indeed courts
have historically taken the position that where demand on
directors is not required because a majority of the corporation's
directors are alleged to have breached a fiduciary duty or committed fraud, a shareholder has standing to pursue the
corporation's claim to judgment.93 Notwithstanding the historical position taken by courts:
Beginning in the mid-1970's, however, action by disinterested direc-

F.2d at 263; Allison v. General Motors Corp., 604 F. Supp. 1106, 1112 (D. Del.),

affd mem., 782 F.2d 1026 (3d Cir. 1985); Tabas v. Mullane, 608 F. Supp. 759, 766
(D.N.J. 1985).
' Spiegel v. Buntrock, 571 A.2d 767, 772-73 (Del. 1990); see also, e.g., Kamen

v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1711, 1719 (1991) ("[Tlhe decisions of a
corporation-including the decision to initiate litigation-should be made by the
board of directors or the majority of shareholders.") (quoting Daily Income Fund,

Inc. v. Fox, 464 U.S. 523, 530 (1984)); Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 200 (Del.
1991) ("The directors of a corporation and not its shareholders manage the business and affairs of the corporation, and accordingly, the directors are responsible
for deciding whether to engage in derivative litigation.") (citations omitted).

90 CLARK, supra note 1, at 641.
9' See generally BLOCK ET AL., supra note 5, at 492-97.
92

M.B.C.A. § 7.44 (Official Cmt. 206).

See, e.g., United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261,
264 (1917).

1993]

DUTY OF LOYALTY

tors-typically in the form of a special litigation committee... comprised entirely of disinterested directors and vested with full authority to decide whether an action should be continued-has been utilized as a means of terminating derivative litigation naming a majority of a corporation's directors as defendants.'

Where the power to terminate exists under applicable
state law, the scope of the court's review of a special litigation
committee's exercise of that power becomes important. Two
competing philosophies have developed. The first, exemplified
by Auerbach v. Bennett,95 adopts the business judgment rule
standard of review--disinterested directors, although constituting a minority of the entire board, can and should be trusted to
decide whether to pursue derivative claims. Judicial review is
therefore limited to the issues of good faith, the independence
of the special litigation committee and the sufficiency of the
committee's investigation; judicial examination of the merits of
the committee's decision is precluded.9 6
The contrary view, exemplified by Zapata Corp. v.
Maldonado,97 leads to the adoption of a more searching judicial review of the merits of a committee's decision. Thus, where
demand is excused and the derivative suit has been properly
commenced (i.e., a majority of the directors has a disabling
conflict of interest), Zapata postulates a two-step test for the
review of a special litigation committee's determination. This
test (i) requires an examination of good faith, the independence
of the special litigation committee and the thoroughness of the
committee's investigation, and (ii) allows (but does not require)
the court to exercise its own "independent business judgment"
and review the merits of the committee's decision. 98 Unlike
the Auerbach approach-with the directors being afforded the
protection of the business judgment rule and its presumption-the Zapata approach places all burdens upon the directors.
Regardless of the scope of judicial review, directors serving

94

BLOCK ET AL., supra note 5, at 497-98; see also id. at 498-502.

f 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979).
Id. at 636, 393 N.E.2d at 1004, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 930; see also Levit v. Rowe,
No. 89-7644, 1992 WL 277997, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 1992) (where "an appro-

priate special committee" was chosen and "the committee's work was acceptable" a
court, under the Auerbach approach, "must respect the committee's decision").
97 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
f Id. at 789.
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on a special litigation committee must be disinterested in the
subject matter of the plaintiffs allegations. Optimally, special
litigation committee members should be directors who were not
on the board at the time the transaction in question occurred,
and who are not defendants in the action.9 Frequently, however, plaintiffs trying to foreclose the possibility of a motion to
terminate attempt to disqualify all the directors simply by
naming them as defendants.' A director's status as a "nominal" defendant in and of itself is insufficient to disqualify that
director from service on a special litigation committee; "[t]o
hold otherwise," as one court recognized, "would allow a small
number of shareholders to 'incapacitate an entire board of
directors' merely by naming the entire board as defendants." 0'
More difficult cases involve directors who, while not directly interested in the transaction underlying the litigation, have
approved the transaction as members of the board, or have
business or social dealings with the corporate officials whose
conduct is being challenged. Although the result in any particular case is dependent upon the circumstances surrounding the
particular special litigation committee and the particular allegations against the defendant-directors, two lines of cases
focusing upon directorial independence in the context of special
litigation committees have emerged.

' See, e.g., id. at 781; Auerbach, 47 N.Y.2d at 625, 393 N.E.2d at 1001, 419
N.Y.S.2d at 928; Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508, 510 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
100 See, e.g., Lewis v. Graves, 701 F.2d 245, 249 (2d Cir. 1983) (plaintiffs strategy of naming all the directors as defendants is a "transparent litigation tactic . . . like [a] slight of hand that is slower than the eye") (emphasis in original),
quoted in Stoner v. Walsh, 772 F. Supp. 790, 803 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); see also, e.g.,
infra note 103 and accompanying text.
...
See, e.g., Mills v. Esmark Corp., 544 F. Supp. 1275, 1283 (N.D. Ill. 1982)
(quoting Zapata v. Maldonado, Inc., 430 A.2d 779, 785 (Del. 1980)). But see N.D.
CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-49 (1985) (authorizing creation of a special litigation committee of two or more disinterested directors or other persons, and stating that "a
director or other person is 'disinterested' if [he or she] . . . has not been made or
threatened to be made a party to the proceeding in question").
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1.

Majority
Required

View:

Substantial

Disabling

Interest

A majority of courts that have considered this issue have
focused upon whether, considering the totality of the circumstances, the members of the special litigation committee are
"in a position to base [their] decision on the merits of the issue
rather than... extraneous considerations or influences."" 2
The courts thus examine the particular facts in each individual
case for signs of "interestedness" on the part of each committee
member, including-but not limited10 to-the
following:
3
* Status as a defendant.
"
Participation in the alleged wrongdoing.0 4
* Nominated to the board of directors by the defendant directors.0 5
* Approval of the transaction underlying the alleged
wrongdoing.0 6
* Presence on the board at the time of the alleged

wrongdoing.' 7
1(2

Kaplan v. Wyatt, 499 A.2d 1184, 1189 (Del. 1985); see also Johnson v. Hui,

811 F. Supp. 479, 486 (N.D. Cal. 1991) ("To determine whether or not the [special
litigation committee] has acted independently and in good faith, the Court must
review the totality of the circumstances . .
").
"I See Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778, 780 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 869 (1980); Johnson, 811 F. Supp. at 486; Stoner, 772 F. Supp. at 802; Mills,
544 F. Supp. at 1283-84; Genzer v. Cunningham, 498 F. Supp. 682, 693 (E.D.
Mich. 1980); Rosengarten v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 466 F. Supp. 817, 821
(S.D.N.Y. 1979); Lewis v. Fuqua. 502 A.2d 962, 966-67 (Del. Ch. 1985), appeal
denied, 504 A.2d 571 (Del. 1986); see also International Broadcasting Corp. v.
Turner, 734 F. Supp. 383, 393 (D. Minn. 1990) (finding interestedness where two
members of three member committee were defendants, and the third member of
committee was a designee to the board by a third party involved in the alleged
wrongdoing).
'° See Johnson, 811 F. Supp. at 486; Mills, 544 F. Stipp. at 1283-84.
1C Weiland v. Illinois Power Co., [1990-91 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) T 95,747, at 98,590 (C.D. Ill. Sept. 17, 1990) ("[I]ndependent directors are
capable of rendering an unbiased decision though they were appointed by the
defendant directors and share a common experience with the defendants.") (citing
Peller v. Southern Co., 707 F. Supp. 525, 527 (N.D. Ga. 1988), affd, 911 F.2d
1532 (11th Cir. 1990)).
" See Mills, 544 F. Supp. at 1283-84; Kaplan 499 A.2d at 1189; cf Bach v.
National W. Life Ins. Co., 810 F.2d 509, 513 (5th Cir. 1987) (vote by special litigation committee members prior to their investigation for a resolution authorizing
reimbursement of other directors' interim litigation expenses held not to establish
interestedness).
1"7 See Lewis, 615 F.2d at 780; Kaplan 499 A.2d at 1189; Rosengarten, 466 F.
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Direct (as8opposed to merely indirect) exposure to
10
liability.
Past or present business contracts or dealings
with the corporation.0 9
Past or present service to the corporation as, for
example, outside counsel or consultant."0
Business or social ties to one or more of the defendants."'
2
Nature of the alleged wrongdoing.1
Advice of and reliance upon independent counsel
of the committee's own choosing."'
Number of directors on the special litigation committee (the more directors, the less weight courts
seem to assign to a particular disabling interest
affecting a single member of the committee)."'

Supp. at 821; Fuqua, 502 A.2d at 966; Blecker v. Araskog, No. 21946-80, slip op.
at 38 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County June 3, 1987).
108 Compare In re General Tire & Rubber Co. Sec. Litig., 726 F.2d 1075, 108384 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 858 (1984) and Lewis, 615 F.2d at 780 with
Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724, 727 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 1017 (1980) and Galef v. Alexander, 615 F.2d 51, 60-61 (2d Cir. 1980).
1
See Hasan v. CleveTrust Realty Investors, 729 F.2d 372, 378-79 (6th Cir.
1984); Johnson, 811 F. Supp. at 486; Rosengarten v. Buckley, 623 F. Supp. 1493,
1500-01 (D. Md. 1985); Kaplan, 499 A.2d at 1189; see also Houle v. Low, 556
N.E.2d 51, 58-59 (Mass. 1990) (finding question of fact regarding interestedness
requiring an evidentiary hearing in case where "professional advancement" of only
member of committee "appear[ed] to be dependent on the individual defendants").
"0 See General Tire, 726 F.2d at 1084; Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. 274,
283 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 671 F.2d 729, 732 (2d Cir. 1982);
Genzer v. Cunningham, 498 F. Supp. 682, 693-94 (E.D. Mich. 1980).
. See Hasan, 729 F.2d at 378-79; Johnson, 811 F. Supp. at 486; Levit v.
Rowe, No. 89-7644, 1992 WL 277997, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 1992); Grill v.
Hoblitzell, 771 F. Supp. 709, 712 (D. Md. 1991); Fuqua, 502 A.2d at 966-67.
"2 See Fuqua, 502 A.2d at 972.
1
See Peller v. Southern Co., 911 F.2d 1532, 1538 (11th Cir. 1990); In re Oracle Securities Litig., No. C-90-0931-VRW, 1993 WL 306658, at *13 (N.D. Cal. Aug.
9, 1993); Levit, No. 89-7644, slip op. at 6; Blecker v. Araskog, No. 21946-80, slip
op. at 38 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 3, 1987); cf In re Par Pharmaceutical, Inc. Derivative Litig., 750 F. Supp. 641, 647 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (refusing to terminate an action
where committee that had recommended termination was not represented by independent counsel).
114 See Johnson, 811 F. Supp. at 486; see also Grafman v. Century Broadcasting
Corp., 762 F. Supp. 215, 219 (N.D. Ill. 1991) ("[Tlhis court cannot see any reason
why a one man committee cannot be independent, or is any less independent than
a two or multiple member committee."); Fuqua, 502 A.2d at 967 ("If a single
member committee is to be used, the member should, like Caesar's wife, be above
reproach."); Houle v. Low, 556 N.E.2d 51, 58-59 (Mass. 1990) ("We decline to adopt
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Courts typically look to all these factors together and, as a
general rule, the only factor that may alone be dispositive
against a special litigation committee member is participation
in the alleged wrongdoing. Where a special litigation committee did not participate in the alleged wrongdoing, courts typically are reluctant to find that director to be interested,'1 5
and will only do so where a substantial disabling interest can
be demonstrated. 6 It is important to note that the
interestedness determination is made at the time the committee moves to terminate the litigation, and not when the committee is formed. 1 '
2.

Minority View: Structural Bias

A second line of cases approaches the issue of assessing
director "interestedness" from the perspective that such a determination involves more than merely whether the director is
a defendant or participated in the alleged wrongdoing. According to this perspective, personal, family and economic relationships to the defendants, for example, may add a substantial
element of bias to an otherwise disinterested director.'

a per se rule that special litigation committees should have more than one director, but we think the number of committee members should be a factor in determining the committee's ability to act independently.").
* See In re General Tire & Rubber Co. Sec. Litig., 726 F.2d 1075, 1083-84,
cert denied, 469 U.S. 858 (1984); Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778, 780 (9th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 869 (1980); Rosengarten v. Buckley, 613 F. Supp.
1493, 1500-01 (D. Md. 1985); Mills v. Esmark, 544 F. Supp. 1275, 1281-88 (N.D.
IM. 1982); Genzer v. Cunningham, 498 F. Supp. 682, 693-94 (E.D. Mich. 1980);
Kaplan v. Wyatt, 499 A.2d 1184, 1189-90 (Del. 1985); Blecker, slip op. at 36-44.
11' See Hasan v. CleveTrust Realty Investors, 729 F.2d 372, 378-79 (6th Cir.
1984); Fuqua, 502 A.2d at 965; see also Kaplan, 499 A.2d at 1190 (plaintiff must
show that the committee member "based his conclusions . . . on .

.

. outside influ-

ence rather than the merits of the issues").
117 See Pompeo v. Hefner, No. 6806, 1983 WL 20284, at *2 (Del. Ch. Mar. 23,
1983) (refusing to consider disinterestedness prior to the committee's completion of
its investigation of one member special litigation committee in case challenging
conduct of 67 percent shareholder). But cf. International Broadcasting Corp. v.
Turner, 734 F. Supp. 383, 393 (D. Minn. 1970) (denying stay of proceedings pending a determination by special litigation committee because committee was not
"sufficiently independent and disinterested.. . to warrant the granting of the
requested stay").
' See generally James D. Cox, Searching for the Corporation'sVoice in Derivative Suit Litigation: A Critique of Zapata and the ALI Project, 1982 DUKE L.J.
959; George W. Dent, Jr., The Power of Directors to Terminate Shareholder Liti-
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Some courts have gone even further and have suggested that
directors on a special litigation committee instinctively will
sympathize with their colleagues on the board, and can be
expected to vote for dismissal of any but the most egregious
and well-substantiated charges.119 These feelings of sympathy, furthermore, may be reinforced where committee members
have been nominated or12 0appointed to their positions by the
defendants in the action.

Such logic, upon which Professor Seligman's proposal
seems to be based,'2 ' however, has been the subject of substantial criticism. As correctly recognized in 1989 by Michael
P. Dooley of the University of Virginia and E. Norman Veasey
of the Delaware Bar (and since 1992, the Chief Justice of the
Delaware Supreme Court), but ignored by Professor Seligman,
the "structural bias" viewpoint has no logical finishing point,
and can be carried to an endless illogical extreme: "If familiarity breeds acquiescence in litigation matters, will it not do so in
other contexts as well? If so, does this not suggest a wholesale
abandonment of the business judgment rule in favor of judicial
review of every board approval of a management proposal that

gation: The Death of the Derivative Suit:, 75 Nw. U. L. REV. 96 (1980).
' See, e.g., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 888 (2d Cir. 1982) ("[S]pecial litigation
committees created to evaluate the merits of certain litigation are appointed by
the defendants to that litigation. It is not cynical to expect that such committees
will tend to view derivative actions against the other directors with skepticism."),
cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983). But see id. at 900 (Cardamone, J., dissenting)
(citation omitted):
When Burks [v. Lasker, 567 F.2d 1208 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 441 U.S. 471
(1979)] was before us we took the same position that the majority now
does, i.e., that directors could never be wholly disinterested in deciding
whether to pursue claims against fellow directors. On appeal that view
was rejected by the Supreme Court which concluded that lack of impartiality of disinterested directors is not a determination to be made as a
matter of law.
"o See, e.g., In re Oracle Sec. Litig., No. C-90-0931-VRW, 1993 WL 306658, at
*13 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 1993) ('independent' directors are often beholden to the
defendant directors who appointed them"); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d
779, 787 (Del. 1981) (describing "a 'there but for the grace of God go r empathy");
Houle v. Low, 556 N.E.2d 51, 54-55 (Mass. 1990) (discussing structural bias theory); see also Lasker v. Burks, 567 F.2d 1208, 1212 (2d Cir. 1978) ("It is asking too
much of human nature to expect that the disinterested directors will view with
the necessary objectivity the actions of their colleagues in a situation where an
adverse decision would be likely to result in considerable expense and liability for
the individuals concerned."), rev'd, 441 U.S. 471 (1979).
121 See Seligman, supra note 2, at 5, 24.
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turns out badly?" 2 Indeed, the logic of the "structural bias"
viewpoint, taken to its extreme, would preclude in many cases
even the creation of a special litigation committee.'
III. THE CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDERS' DUTY OF LOYALTY
Like directors, controlling or dominating shareholders owe
fiduciary duties to a corporation's shareholder body as a whole,
including minority shareholders.' Unlike directors, however,
a controlling shareholder's fiduciary duties arise from the exercise of the controlling shareholder's power. Indeed, in order to
have fiduciary obligations a shareholder must "affirmatively
undertake[] to dictate the destiny of the corporation."" Although issues involving the controlling shareholder's fiduciary
duties are always present whenever a controlling shareholder
engages in a transaction with the controlled corporation, such
issues are exacerbated in the context of cash-out mergers. 6
1
Michael P. Dooley & E. Norman Veasey, The Role of the Board in Derivative
Litigation: Delaware Law and the Current ALl Proposals Compared, 44 Bus. LAw.
503, 534-35 (1989); see also Weiland v. Illinois Power Co., [1990-91 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
95,747, at 98,590-91 (C.D. Ill. Sept. 17, 1990)
([Structural bias should not destroy the independence of an independent litigation
committee, but it should be considered in reviewing the actions and decisions of
the independent litigation committee.") (citing Peller v. Southern Co., 707 F. Supp.
525, 527 (N.D. Ga. 1988)); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 815 n.8 (Del. 1984) (in
rejecting the "structural bias" argument, the Delaware Supreme Court noted that
"discretionary review by the Court of Chancery of complaints alleging specific facts
pointing to bias on a particular board will be sufficient for determining demand
futility-).
1" See Miller v. Register & Tribune Syndicate, Inc., 336 N.W.2d 709 (Iowa
1983).
12 See, e.g., Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939); Southern Pac. Co. v.
Bogert, 250 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1919); In re Reading Co., 711 F.2d 509, 517 (3d Cir.
1983); Zahn v. Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36, 42-43 (3d Cir. 1947); Harriman v.
E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 372 F. Supp. 101, 105-06 (D. Del. 1974). But see
Barris Indus., Inc. v. Bryan, No. 88-0188-R, slip op. at 5 (E.D. Va. Aug. 15, 1988)
("Controlling shareholders, as such, simply do not owe fiduciary duties to other
shareholders.").
1
Harriman, 372 F. Supp. at 106; see also Gottesman v. General Motors Corp.,
279 F. Supp. 361, 383-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Allied Chem. & Dye Corp. v. Steel &
Tube Co. of Am., 120 A. 486, 491 (Del. Ch. 1923).
12 Outside the context of cash-out mergers, the business judgment rule will
protect a parent corporation's conduct with respect to business transactions with a
subsidiary where the parent did not cause "the subsidiary to act in such a way
that the parent receives something from the subsidiary to the exclusion of, and
detriment to, the minority stockholders of the subsidiary." Sinclair Oil Corp. v.
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Cash-Out Merger Transactions

Mergers that "by majority rule" force minority interests to
give up their equity in a corporation in exchange for cash or
senior securities while allowing the controlling shareholder or
shareholders to retain their equity have been labeled "cashout," "freeze-out," "squeeze-out" and "take-out" mergers.'
Such transactions may arise in the context of parent-subsidiary mergers, "going private" mergers and two-step
mergers.' Absent the utilization of certain safeguards,'29
the danger in such transactions that "a self-interested majority
stockholder or control group [will act] unfairly"3 ' to the minority shareholders precludes business judgment rule protection in connection with litigation challenging the transactions
themselves or seeking to impose liability on the corporate fiduciary. Rather, the controlling shareholder has the burden of
demonstrating the entire fairness of the transaction or securing the informed approval of a majority of either disinterested
directors or minority shareholders.'
The Delaware Supreme Court summarized the necessary
showing of fairness that directors must make in these cases in
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc."' Weinberger involved a cash-out
merger between UOP, Inc. ("UOP") and its majority owner,
The Signal Companies, Inc. ("Signal"). Specifically, two years
after Signal acquired its position in UOP at a price of twentyLevien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 853 (1988), quoted in
Summa Corp. v. TWA, Inc., 540 A.2d 403, 407 (Del. 1988).
1" See Alpert v. 28 Williams St. Corp., 63 N.Y.2d 557, 566 n.2, 473 N.E.2d 19,
24 n.2, 483 N.Y.S.2d 667, 672 n.2 (1984).
'28 Id.
at 563, 567 n.3, 473 N.E.2d at 22, 24 n.3, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 670, 672 n.3.
1
See infra notes 145-62 and accompanying text.
13 Alpert, 63 N.Y.2d at 566 n.2, 473 N.E.2d at 24 n.2, 483 N.Y.S.2d at 672 n.2
(quoting Victor Brudney & Marvin A. Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate
Freezeouts, 87 YALE L.J. 1354, 1358 (1978)).
...See, e.g., Bershad v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 535 A.2d 840, 846 (Del. 1987);
Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 937 (Del. 1985); Weinberger v. UOP,
Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 703 & 710-14 (Del. 1983); American Gen. Corp. v. Texas Air
Corp., No. 8390, 1987 WL 6337, at *4 (Del. Ch. Feb. 5, 1987); cf Abbey v.
Montedisdn S.P.A., 143 Misc. 2d 72, 78, 539 N.Y.S.2d 862, 866 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1989) (New York law imposes a duty on a majority shareholder to offer a
fair price in the context of a freeze-out merger, but "[iut is by no means apparent"
that such a duty would be imposed in the context of a tender offer by a majority
shareholder.").
12 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983).
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one dollars per share, Signal's management began considering
the acquisition of the remainder of UOP's outstanding
shares. 13 3 Two Signal directors who were also members of
UOP's board utilized UOP information to prepare a feasibility
study concerning the proposed acquisition, and concluded that
the transaction would be a good investment for Signal at any
price up to twenty-four dollars per share.3 4
Signal's senior management then determined to propose a
cash-out merger in the range of twenty dollars to twenty-one
dollars per share, constituting an almost fifty percent premium
over UOP's then market price. 135 UOP's president-who was
also a Signal director and a long-time Signal employee-was
told of Signal's plan, and voiced no objection to what he said
was a "generous" price.136 An investment banking firm was
retained and "hurriedly prepared" a fairness opinion concluding that either twenty dollars or twenty-one dollars per share
would be a fair price.' 7 Signals board then authorized a
twenty-one dollars per share offer, and UOP's board accepted
the proposal. 3 ' UOP's shareholders voted to approve the
transaction, with almost fifty-two percent of the non-Signal
held shares voting in favor of the merger.3 9
In reviewing the transaction, the Delaware Supreme Court
held that Signal's conduct did not satisfy the "fair dealing" aspect of the fairness standard.' ° In so holding, the court emphasized:
The concept of fairness has two basic aspects: fair dealing and fair
price. The former embraces questions of when the transaction was

timed, how it was initiated, structured, negotiated, disclosed to the
directors,

and how the approvals of the directors and the

stockholders were obtained. The latter aspect of fairness relates to
the economic and financial considerations of the proposed [transaction], including all relevant factors: assets, "market value, earnings,
future prospects, and any other elements that affect the intrinsic or
inherent value of a company's stock. However, the test for fairness is

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
"7 Id.
Id.
' Id.
Id.
''

at
at
at
at
at
at
at
at

704.
705, 709.
705, 706.
705.
706-07.
707.
708.
711.
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not a bifurcated one as between fair dealing and price. All aspects of
the issue must be examined as a whole since the question is one of
entire fairness.'

The Supreme Court in Weinberger remanded the issue of
fair price to the Court of Chancery for further consideration
and directed that in making this determination all relevant
factors were to be considered, including any valuation techniques or methods generally considered acceptable in the financial community.' This procedure, the court also directed,
was to be applied in the future in appraisal proceedings, which
would "ordinarily" constitute the exclusive remedy of dissenting shareholders, subject to the historic power of the Court
of Chancery "to fashion any form of equitable and monetary
relief as may be appropriate."
Id. at 711, quoted in Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1376 (Del. 1993);
see also Sealy Mattress Co. of N.J. v. Sealy, Inc., 532 A.2d 1324, 1335 (Del. Ch.
1987) ("The majority stockholder [is] obliged not to time or structure the transaction, or to manipulate the corporation's values, so as to permit or facilitate the
forced elimination of the minority stockholders at an unfair price."). But see Pittsburgh Terminal Corp. v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 875 F.2d 549 (6th Cir. 1989):
[We do not interpret the Maryland test for the fairness of a transaction
as one involving separate considerations of both "fair price" and "fair
dealing." ...
Maryland law, unlike Delaware law as expressed in
Weinberger, does not explicitly require consideration of the fairness of the
defendants' valuation procedures; and ... even if Maryland had adopted
the Weinberger approach, the dominant consideration of the fairness of a
transaction remains price.
Id. at 554. See generally ABA Comm. on Corp. Laws, Guidelines for the Unaffiliated Director of the Controlled Corporation,44 BUS. LAw. 211, 217-21 (1988) (suggesting "factors and procedures to be considered by unaffiliated directors when
reviewing transactions" between "controlling shareholder[s] and the controlled corporation"); Charles F. Richards, Jr. & Gregory P. Williams, Rulings of Delaware
Courts on Subsidiary Acquisitions, N.Y. L.J., Oct. 7, 1987, at 31, 35 (reviewing
principles that "should substantially increase the likelihood that a transaction will
survive the scrutiny of the Delaware courts").
142 457 A-2d at 712-14; see also Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 542 A.2d 1182,
1186-87 (Del. 1988).
1
Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 714; see also Cede, 542 A.2d at 1188-90 (holding
that fraud action based upon newly discovered facts was not foreclosed by
shareholder's earlier election of an appraisal remedy, but that the fraud claim
could not be asserted in the appraisal proceeding).
14 Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 714; see also Cede, 542 A.2d at 1186-92 (holding
that shareholder dissenting from a cash-out merger may pursue both an appraisal
remedy and a subsequent individual action for rescissory damages based on a
later-discovered claim of fraud in the merger, and that both claims should be
consolidated with the shareholder not being required to elect one remedy or the
other prior to trial); Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chem. Corp., 498 A.2d 1099, 1104141
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Cash-out Mergers and DisinterestedDirectors

The court in Weinberger suggested that the result "could
have been entirely different if UOP had appointed an independent negotiating committee of its outside directors to deal with
Signal at arm's length."'4 5 The court explained that "fairness
in this context can be equated to conduct by a theoretical,
wholly independent board of directors," and that "a showing
that the action taken was as though each of the contending
parties had in fact exerted its bargaining power against the
other at arm's length is strong evidence that the transaction
meets the test of fairness." 46
The court also recognized that the approval of the majority
of the corporation's minority shareholders ordinarily shifts the
burden of demonstrating unfairness to the plaintiff where the
otherwise interested party demonstrates complete disclosure of
all material facts relevant to the transaction. 47 The court
held, however, that the UOP minority's approval of the transaction was "meaningless" because the minority shareholders
were denied "critical information." Thus, based upon the circumstances underlying the shareholder vote-the failure to
disclose material information to the minority-the court could
not "conclude that the shareholder vote was an informed one." 48
05 (Del. 1985) (noting that remedies other than appraisal are available where
appraisal cannot adequately redress the alleged wrong, even under circumstances
where there are no allegations of fraud or misrepresentation); Sealy, 532 A.2d at
1341 (rejecting argument that "injunctive relief has been judicially eliminated as a
remedy in all but the most 'extremely usual' parent-subsidiary merger cases"); cf.
Steinberg v. Amplica, 729 P.2d 683 (Cal. 1986) (en banc) (appraisal held to constitute exclusive remedy under California law for shareholder alleging that his shares
were undervalued because of fraud and breach of fiduciary duty by majority shareholder).
" 457 A.2d at 709 n.7.
Id. at 710 n.7 (citations omitted); see also Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM
Acquis., Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 277 (2d Cir. 1986) (noting appropriateness of an "independent negotiating committee of outside directors" in the context of a management leveraged-buyout transaction).
...Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 703; see also Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211,
224 (Del. 1979); Schlossberg v. First Artists Prod. Co., No. CIV. A. 6670, 1986 WL
15143, at *4 (Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 1986).
148 457 A.2d at 712. On remand, the Court of Chancery concluded that while "a
damage figure cannot be ascertained ... with any degree of precision," a one
dollar per share award would represent a "fair measure of compensation for the
wrong done to the members of the minority." Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., No. 5642,
1985 WL 11546, at *9, 10 (Del. Ch. Jan. 30, 1985), affd, 497 A.2d 792 (Del.
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Two years after its decision in Weinberger, the Delaware
Supreme Court once again emphasized the importance of disinterested directors in Rabkin v. Philip A Hunt Chemical
Corp." In Rabkin, the supreme court, reversing the court of
chancery's grant of a motion to dismiss,1 0 acknowledged that
in the context of litigation arising from a cash-out merger "the
use of an independent negotiating committee of outside directors may have significant advantages to the majority stockholder in defending suits of this type." In the case before it,
however, the court recognized that the parent's "alleged attitude toward the minority, at least as it appears on the face of
the complaints.... coupled with the apparent absence of any
meaningful negotiations as to price, all have an air reminiscent
of the dealings between Signal and UOP in Weinberger."5'
Unlike the conduct of the majority shareholder in
Weinberger and Rabkin, Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co.152 provides an example of a parent's acquisition of a less than wholly-owned subsidiary that was found to satisfy Weinberger's fair
dealing/fair price standard. The court emphasized the "adversarial nature of the negotiations" between the parent and the
subsidiary, and the absence of any "credible evidence" indicating that the parent had dictated the terms of the transaction.'53 The court also described the parent's concern about
shareholder litigation throughout the negotiations' and the
questioning of representatives of the parent, two investment
banking firms, the subsidiary's own counsel and counsel for a
shareholder threatening legal action by the subsidiary's directors.'55 The court also relied upon the committee's lengthy

1985).
,4 498 A.2d 1099 (Del. 1985).
1" See Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chem. Corp., 480 A.2d 655, 661 (Del. Ch.

1984), rev'd, 498 A.2d 1099 (Del. 1985).
...Rabkin, 498 A.2d at 1106; see also Sealy Mattress Co. of N.J. v. Sealy, Inc.,
532 A.2d 1324, 1333-40 (Del. Ch. 1987) (providing what the court characterized as
"a textbook study on how one might violate as many fiduciary precepts as possible
in the course of a single merger transaction," and granting preliminary injunctive
relief); American Gen. v. Texas Air Corp., No. 8390, 1987 WL 6337, at *8 (Del.
Ch. Feb. 5, 1987) (denying preliminary injunctive relief but finding reasonable
probability of success on claim that merger transaction was structured unfairly).
152 493 A.2d 929, 931 (Del. 1985).
.. Id. at 937.
'
Id. at 934.
"' Id.
at 939.
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and detailed review of asset values and the fact that there had
been asset-by-asset bargaining between the parties to conclude
that the price received by the minority shareholders was
fair56
The Court of Chancery in In re Trans World Airlines, Inc.
Shareholders Litigation ("TWA") 57 went one step further
than the Supreme Court of Delaware with regard to the usefulness of special committees. In TWA, the Chancellor stated
explicitly that when properly employed, "the device of the special negotiating committee of disinterested directors" has the
effect of "making the substantive law aspect of the business
judgment rule applicable," and thus places upon the plaintiffs
the "particular and... particularly difficult" burden of demonstrating that a corporation's merger with a controlling
infringes upon the rights of minority shareholdshareholder
l58
ers."
In TWA, however, the court found that a special committee
appointed to represent minority shareholders in connection
with a proposed controlling shareholder merger "did not adequately understand its function-to aggressively seek to pro-

"'
17

Id. at 941.

No. 9844, 1988 WL 111271 (Del. Ch. Oct. 21, 1988).
" Id. at *7.But see Citron v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 584 A.2d 490,
501 (Del. Ch. 1990).
Unlike TWA (written by Chancellor William T. Allen), DuPont (written by
Vice Chancellor William B. Chandler, III) did not extend business judgment rule
protection to the underlying transaction. Specifically, the court found that "in a
parent-subsidiary merger context, shareholder ratification operates only to shift the
burden of persuasion, not to change the substantive standard of review (entire
fairness). Nor does the fact that the merger was negotiated by a committee of
independent, disinterested directors alter the review standard." DuPont, 584 A.2d
at 502. According to the court in DuPont, shareholder approval or independent
negotiations by disinterested directors affords business judgment rule protection
only to the subsidiary's directors; the parent's directors' conduct (and the transaction itself) will continue to be evaluated under the "entire fairness' mode of analysis," with the burden of proving "unfairness" being placed upon the plaintiff." Id.
at 501-02; cf Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., No. 8358, 1991 WL 111134, at *9
(Del. Ch. June 24, 1991) (Chancellor Allen recognized the conflict between the
Chancery Court decisions in TWA and DuPont and noted that "[hiappily, this case
does not require one to re-enter th[e] thicket" surrounding "the appropriateness of
a particular form of judicial review when an allegedly independent entity has been
interposed between a controlling shareholder and the effectuation of a transaction
in which it is interested (i.e., committees of allegedly disinterested directors or
majority of minority vote provisions)").
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mote and protect the minority interests."159 The court also
found that the committee did not "strive to negotiate the highest or best available transaction for the shareholders," as opposed to one that simply fell "within a range of fairness.""6
Accordingly, the court held that the committee "did not supply
an acceptable surrogate for the energetic, informed and aggressive negotiation that one would reasonably expect from an
arm's-length adversary" 6' and that plaintiffs had therefore
raised "such substantial questions" regarding the committee's
effectiveness that "no weight may be accorded to [the
committee's] actions."6 2
IV. CURRENT TRENDS IN BOARD COMPOSITION

As discussed above, corporate governance is a dynamic
process that is constantly evolving. As courts and legislatures
have recognized the benefits of having outside directors"
serving on boards, commentators have likewise emphasized the
significance that such directors play in the corporate governance structure. Indeed, the belief that outside directors play
an important role in corporate governance was fostered, in
part, by the publication during the late-1970s of the "white
papers" by the Business Roundtable ("BRT") and the ABA.
Both organizations noted "the strong tendency of U.S. business
corporations to move toward a board structure based upon a
majority of outside directors,"" and praised that trend. The
BRT emphasized:
[i]t is our belief that in most instances - there will be exceptions
based on the particular situation of an enterprise - it is desirable
that the board be composed of a majority of non-management directors .... [T]he fact that a majority of directors have no immediate
accountability for short range financial results assures greater de-

159TWA, No. 9844, 1988 WL 111271, at *7.
160 Id.

at *4.
161Id. at *7.

Id. at *9.
Unless otherwise noted, the term "outside director" refers to a non-employee
director, and the term "inside director" refers to a director who is also a corporate
officer.
16 The Business Roundtable: The Role and Composition of the Board of Directors of the Large Publicly Owned Corporation, 33 Bus. LAW. 2083, 2108 (1978).
162
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tachment and a better focus on longer-range corporate interests. "

Similarly, the ABA stated:
A substantial number of large, publicly held business corporations
have tended increasingly in recent years to structure their boards of
directors so that a majority of the board is composed of non-management directors. While it is not believed necessary that this pattern
be mandated for all corporations, it is highly recommended as a
means of maintaining a board and committee environment condu6
cive to effective exercise of independent judgment."

Recent empirical data reflects that corporate America has
recognized the benefits associated with having outside directors comprise a majority of corporate boards. Specifically, during the past twenty years, many corporations have nominated
and elected an increasing number of non-employee directors,
and many boards are now composed of a majority of outside
directors. A survey of a select group of large, publicly owned
corporations conducted in 1991, for example, indicated that
outside directors, on average, comprised seventy-five percent of
a corporation's board (each board consisting of, on average,
three inside directors and nine outside directors)." 7 In 1980,
by comparison, one commentator noted:
Nearly half (48.5%) of the directors of companies with over $150
million in assets were persons "independent" of management in a
rigorous sense. These "independent" directors were not present or
former officers, employees, relatives of officers, creditors, suppliers,
customers, retained attorneys, investment bankers, or control stockholders of the company. In other words, the new breed of directors
has no economic stake in the company, other than the relatively
modest compensation associated with the directorship."

This evolution towards an outside director-dominated

165

'"

Id.
ABA Comm. on Corp. Laws, supra note 28, at 1625 (footnote omitted).

KoRN/FERRY INTL, BOARD OF DIRECTORS TWENTIETH ANNUAL STUDY 13 (June
1993) [hereinafter TWENTIETH ANNUAL STUDY]. See Appendix Table. One thousand
companies were asked to participate in the TWENTIETH ANNUAL STUDY, and 327
167

responded. The companies asked to participate included the Fortune 500, the Fortune 100 major service companies, the Fortune 50 major banking institutions, 50
major insurance companies, 50 major diversified financial companies, 50 major
retailers, 50 major transportation companies and 150 selected smaller companies.
Id. at 26.
16 Robert J. Haft, Business Decisions by the New Board: Behavioral Science and
Corporate Law, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1, 3 (1981).
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board was the product of numerous factors. In addition to
judicial decisions, legislative enactments and commentary, all
of which emphasize the importance of outside directors, a belief by management that outside directors play an important
and beneficial role in corporate governance is a significant
factor that deserves emphasis. Specifically, over the last two
decades, corporate managers have begun to recognize that
outside directors could bring to a board several important
potential advantages.
First, outside directors could utilize their experiences and
perspectives to provide an extra dimension of input and, thus,
assist in the corporate managers' decisionmaking process." 9
Indeed, many chief executive officers acknowledge that they
"look to their outside directors to give them sound counsel and
a broad prospective." 7 ° These directors are, in other words,
"windows on the world who provide a protection against insularity and lack of vision."
Second, outside directors would be well suited to serve on
audit, compensation and nominating committees. Specifically,
much of a board's most important management monitoring is
performed by these "overview" committees. Indeed, as several
commentators have noted, the effectiveness of such committees
may depend on the extent to which they are composed of outside directors. 2 A corporation, therefore, may benefit from
having its auditing, nomination and compensation processes
overseen by independent persons having no personal stake in
the decisions being made.'
Thus, by necessity, a corporate

"9

See KORN/FERRY INTL, BOARD OF DIRECTORS NINETEENTH ANNUAL STUDY 17

(June 1992) (CEO's "look for people who have the experience to help set the
company's direction and who possess the stature, seniority and independence to
advise senior management...
") [hereinafter NINETEENTH ANNUAL STUDY];
KORN/FERRY INT'L, BOARD OF DIRECTORS EIGHTEENTH ANNUAL STUDY 4 (June
1991) (outside directors "serve a critical function by expanding the CEO's frame of
reference by bringing judgment born of extended experience ...
') [hereinafter

EIGHTEENTH ANNUAL STUDY].
170Haft, supra note 168, at 3.
.. The Business Roundtable, supra note 164, at 2107.
" See, e.g., ABA Comm. on Corporate Laws, The Overview Committees of the
Board of Directors, 35 Bus. LAW. 1335, 1337 (1980); ABA Comm. on Corporate
Laws, supra note 28, at 1625.
173 Cf SEC v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 629 F.2d 62, 75 (D.C. Cir.) ("The existence of [an audit] committee implies a structured investigation and analysis of a
company's fiscal welfare. Informal procedures may be adequate, but formal entities
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board would need a significant number of outside directors if it
was to implement such a committee structure without unduly
burdening a few individuals.
Third, outside directors are relied upon to reach informed
and independent decisions regarding the fairness of proposed
transactions or other dealings between the corporation and
affiliated persons. For example, as previously discussed, in a
majority of jurisdictions, approval or ratification by disinterested directors of a transaction between the corporation and management, after full disclosure, can obviate litigation challenging the propriety of such a transaction. 74 Outside directors,
therefore, may provide a "safe harbor" with respect to conflictof-interest transactions.
Fourth, outside directors might be less inhibited about
questioning senior management. Indeed, chief executive officers emphasize that it is beneficial to the corporation for them
to have "someone they can talk with openly and candidly." 75
Moreover, the presence of outside directors on the board can
act as a catalyst to encourage a corporation's management to
formulate and present to the board informed and thorough
recommendations.
Finally, the presence of prominent and disinterested persons on a corporation's board should simply enhance a
corporation's image and assist in defending the board's decisions. 76 Outside directors, therefore, can create an overall
environment conducive to effective, independent judgment.
In sum, enormous changes have occurred in the governance of public corporations during the past decade that provide internal mechanisms to resolve most intracorporate disputes-including conflict of interest transactions-without

such as committees create at least the impression of great care and precision
through detailed review and oversight."), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1012 (1980).
'7'See supra notes 57-59, 67-76 & 145-62 and accompanying text; see also International Ins. Co. v. Johns, 874 F.2d 1447, 1460-61 (11th Cir. 1989); Marciano v.
Nakash, 535 A.2d 400, 405 n.3 (Del. 1987).
175EIGHTEENTH ANNUAL STUDY, supra note 169, at 4; id.("A full 82 percent [of
the 352 chief executive officers that responded to the study] stated that they like
to converse with individual directors for brainstorming sessions between formal
meetings."); see also NINETEENTH ANNUAL STUDY, supra note 169, at 5 ("CEO's

look to their outside directors to give them sound counsel and a broad perspective ....').
176
See supra notes 57-59, 67-76 & 145-62 and accompanying text.
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judicial involvement. Indeed, with the oversight provided by
disinterested directors, enhanced judicial scrutiny of conflict of
interest transactions (where such transactions were approved
or ratified by disinterested directors) would unnecessarily
increase the number of lawsuits brought against corporate
fiduciaries at a time when there is general agreement that
there is too much litigation in this country.'7 7
V. PROPOSED CODIFICATION OF CORPORATE LAW

In his contribution to this Symposium, Professor Seligman
proposes, to some degree, federal regulation of state corporate
law:
One area today where sufficient evidence has accumulated to justify
possible congressional action would be the duties of loyalty and care.
I would urge that this examination be limited to only the largest of
the publicly traded corporations; for example, those otherwise subject to SEC jurisdiction under section 12 of the 1934 Act.
The federal fiduciary duty cause of action Congress could enact
would be litigated in federal court and would expressly prohibit
federal courts from deferring to special litigation committees in suits
properly alleging the misconduct of any member of the board of di-

rectors. The federal fiduciary standard should substitute for the
special litigation committee the federal courts' standards for dismissal of nonmeritorious suits. The new standard will pose some difficult
drafting problems.178

Professor Seligman's position ignores two facts. First, it
discounts the advancements in corporate governance over the
past two decades. Courts, legislatures, commentators and corporate America itself have emphasized the significance of having outside directors on a corporate board and courts and legis-

177 See, e.g., John Toothman, Greasing the Wheels for Civil-Justice Reform, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 18, 1993, at 43 (quoting then-President-elect Clinton for the proposition that "[t]here is too much abusive litigation in this country"); Michele Galen,
Guilty! Too Many Lawyers And Too Much Litigation: Here's A Better Way, Bus.
WY-, Apr. 13, 1992, at 60 ("Every branch of government is pushing some package
of legal reform. Congress is overseeing 'advisory committees' in every federal court
to try to speed up cases and cut costs. Judges are overhauling the federal rules
of civil procedure."); Randall Samborn, The Battle Escalates on Reform, NATL L.J.,
Mar. 2, 1992, at 1 ("Although pursuing similar objectives simultaneously, Congress,
the courts and the Bush administration are advancing separate initiatives to reduce the cost and delay of litigation in the federal courts.").
1
Seligman, supra note 2, at 61 (emphasis added).

DUTY OFLOYALTY

1993]

latures have recognized that courts should give great deference
in reviewing business decisions where the decisionmaker is not
tainted by personal financial interest. Federal regulation of
corporate law, as proposed by Professor Seligman, would needlessly subject to enhanced judicial scrutiny the decisions of
disinterested directors (even where such directors constitute a
majority of the board) whenever a corporate fiduciary is involved in "alleged misconduct."
Second, as recently demonstrated by the more-than-fourteen year odyssey travelled by the American Law Institute's
("ALI") corporate governance project,'79 the "difficult drafting
problems" that Congress would face in attempting to codify
"[t]he federal fiduciary cause of action" may be an understatement. The controversy surrounding the ALI's corporate governance project, as reflected by the numerous drafts of the project and the prolonged period of time needed for completion,
demonstrates that any effort to formulate a "national" corporate law-attempting to codify the various (and differing) applications of corporate law adopted by the states-is not an
easy undertaking.8 0 Professor Seligman is inviting Congress
to proceed with such an undertaking. Given the "difficult drafting problems" associated with such an endeavor and the limited need-if any-for a "federal fiduciary cause of action," this
Article urges that Professor Seligman's invitation be declined.
In contrast to the position of Professor Seligman-that
federal regulation of fiduciary duties is needed 8' because
state law has "increasingly erected barriers to derivative
claims challenging" 82 alleged misconduct by corporate fiduciaries-as demonstrated by the well-developed state law dis"' Weil, Gotshal & Manges is counsel to The Business Roundtable's Corporate
Responsibility Task Force in connection with the American Law Institute's corporate governance project.
- See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMIENDATIONS, 1992 A.L.I. (Mar. 31, 1992) (Proposed Final
Draft); see also, e.g., Dennis J. Block et al., Derivative Litigation: Current Law
Versus the American Law Institute, 48 BUS. LAW. 1443 (1993); Michael P. Dooley,
Two Models of Corporate Governance, 47 BUS. LAw. 461 (1992); Dooley & Veasey,
supra note 122; Charles Hansen et al., The Role of DisinterestedDirectors in "Conflict" Transactions: The ALI Corporate Governance Project and Existing Law, 45
BUS. LAw. 2083 (1990) (each critical of various sections of the ALI corporate governance project).
181 See Seligman, supra note 2, at 62.
"2

Id. at 60.
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cussed above, the standard by which courts have reviewed
claims for breach of fiduciary duties has evolved with the advancements in corporate governance. Accordingly, the creation
of a "federal fiduciary duty cause of action"-as proposed by
Professor Seligman (or anyone else to date)-is unnecessary
offering little potential assistance with respect to modern corporate governance.
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APPENDIX
PRESENT NUMBER OF BOARD MEMBERS

Type and Size of Company
Industrials
Under $400 million .......
$400-599 million .........
$600-999 million .........
$1-2.999 billion ..........
$3-4.999 billion ..........
$5 billion & over .........
Banks and other Financial
Institutions ...........
Insurance Companies .....
Retailers ...............
Services Companies .......
Average ................

Average
Number
Inside
Directors

Average
Number
Outside
Directors

Average
Number
Directors

2
3
3
2
4
3

6
7
7
8
9
10

8
10
10
10
13
13

2
4
2
2
3

11
12
10
9
9

13
16
12
11
12

